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Abstract
In this article we analyze the non-linear effect of ownership structure, growth, and in-
debtedness opportunities on the debt maturity of Chilean companies. A sample of 20,586
companies extracted from the Longitudinal Business Survey was used and a Tobit Re-
gression Model was applied. The results showed that ownership concentration reduced
debt maturity. Managerial ownership had a positive and non-linear effect on debt terms,
where managerial entrenchment promoted long-term debt for low managerial ownership
levels. State ownership had a positive impact on debt maturity. Growth opportunities
had a negative impact, while leverage had a positive impact, although their effects are
not persistent and depend on the level of these attributes. This study is a pioneer in the
use of a wide sample of companies and will allow investors to make better investment
decisions since they will be able to identify companies according to these attributes and
mitigate the wealth expropriation risk.
JEL Classification: G31, G32, G34
Keywords: Debt maturity, Managerial ownership, State ownership, Growth opportunities,
Leverage
Efectos no lineales de la Estructura de Propiedad, Oportunidades
de Crecimiento y Leverage sobre la Madurez de la Deuda en
Firmas Chilenas
Resumen
En este artículo analizamos el efecto no lineal de la estructura de propiedad, oportunida-
des de crecimiento y endeudamiento sobre la madurez de la deuda en empresas chilenas.
Usamos 20586 empresas extraídas de la Encuesta Longitudinal de Empresas y aplicamos
un modelo Tobit. Nuestros resultados demuestran que la concentración de la propiedad
reduce de la madurez de la deuda. La propiedad gerencial tiene un efecto positivo y
no lineal sobre el plazo de la deuda, donde para bajos niveles de propiedad gerencial, el
atrincheramiento gerencial promueve la deuda de largo plazo. La propiedad estatal incide
positivamente sobre la madurez de la deuda. Las oportunidades de crecimiento tienen un
efecto negativo sobre la madurez de la deuda, mientras que el leverage afecta en forma
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Resumen
afecta en forma positiva. Aunque sus efectos no son persistentes y dependen del nivel de
estos atributos. Este estudio es pionero en utilizar una amplia muestra de empresas y
permitirá a los inversionistas tomar mejores decisiones de inversión ya que podrán iden-
tificar las empresas de acuerdo a estos atributos y mitigar el riesgo de expropiación de
riqueza.
Clasificación JEL: G31, G32, G34
Palabras clave: madurez, propiedad gerencial, propiedad estatal, oportunidades de creci-
miento, leverage
1. Introduction
Debt maturity has been a widely investigated subject in corporate finance. Several studies
have shown that debt maturity is determined by specific firm characteristics (Myers, 1977;
Datta et al., 2005; Benmelech, 2006) as well as structural elements of countries (Joeveer,
2013; Turk, 2016).
Specific company factors, such as ownership structure, and particularly managerial
ownership, have been the focus of analysis due to its relevance on debt maturity. The lack
of consensus regarding its effects has led researchers to propose different explanations that
contrasts the hypothesis of managerial entrenchment suggested by Datta et al. (2005)
and Benmelech (2006), where debt maturity increases proportionally with managerial
ownership, and the hypothesis of control indicated by Ozkan (2000) and Guney and
Ozkan (2005), where debt terms are reduced. Our investigation deepens this discussion
and provides an explanation that combines both arguments. Another relevant aspect
in this matter is the participation of the State in firms, which has increased since the
2008 financial crisis. This fact has put in the debate the relevance of State capitalism
as indicated by Borisova et al. (2012), drawing the interest of researchers towards the
effects of State ownership on corporate decisions, such as it is debt maturity decision.
International evidence is scarce in this matter and it is non-existent in the case of Chile.
Growth opportunities and debt level are also determining factors for debt maturity.
Its effects have been widely discussed, but little consensual. Discrepancies regarding the
effects of growth opportunities are explained by a persistent trade-off between underin-
vestment costs (Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Ozkan, 2000) and the costs of
bankruptcy and liquidity (Diamond, 1991; Childs et al., 2005). Likewise, leverage would
have positive as well as negative effects on debt maturity. This is because the relationship
between leverage and maturity evaluate the trade-off between overinvestment costs (Bar-
clay et al., 2003) and bankruptcy costs (Leland and Toft, 1996). We believe that the lack
of consensus regarding the effects of these factors on debt maturity is due to a non-linear
relationship determined by the level of these factors, an aspect that has not been covered
in the Chilean literature on this subject.
The objective of our research is to analyze the possible non-linear effects of ownership
structure, growth opportunities and debt levels on the debt maturity of Chilean firms. Our
research contributes to the existing empirical evidence in three ways. First, we analyzed
the non-linear effect of ownership structure, particularly the effects of managerial and
State ownership. Regarding the possible non-linear effect of managerial ownership, we
sought to contrast whether this is a means of entrenching administrators or aligning
them with the interests of company owners. This fact is relevant in Chile as it is a
country governed by civil law and, therefore, debt maturity can be transformed into a
means of mitigating conflicts of interest between owners and managers. State ownership
analysis and its effect on debt maturity is an unprecedented factor for the Chilean and
Latin American market. Our focus was to verify whether the participation of the State in
firm ownership is a means of guaranteeing access to long-term debt. Second, we studied
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the eventual non-monotonous effect of growth opportunities as a way to contrast the
trade-off between underinvestment costs and bankruptcy costs. Third, we analyzed the
effect of debt levels on debt maturity, focusing on the trade-off between overinvestment
costs and bankruptcy costs, as well as the differences of this trade-off between small and
large firms.
We used a sample of 20,586 firms obtained from the Longitudinal Business Survey
(LBS). The sample used in this study differentiates our research from previous works ca-
rried out in Chile, since we included companies of different sizes, structures and productive
sectors. Our results indicate that managerial and State ownership foster long-term debt.
Our results show that managers entrenchment to avoid exposure to external financiers,
while the role of the State in corporate ownership fosters access to long-term financing.
Non-linearity in these variables suggests that the described effects are reversed for high
levels of managerial and State ownership. Growth opportunities were found to have a ne-
gative and non-linear impact on debt maturity, which supports the existence of a trade-off
between underinvestment and bankruptcy costs. In terms of debt, the non-linear effect
ratifies the trade-off between overinvestment and bankruptcy costs. This trade-off favors
long-term debt in small firms and encourages short-term debt in large firms.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews literature
concerning the effects of ownership structure, growth opportunities and debt levels on
debt maturity. This section also presents the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and
analysis methodologies used in this research. Section 4 shows the results obtained. Finally,
section 5 presents the conclusions of our study and recommendations for future research.
2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis
2.1. Effects of ownership structure on debt maturity
Ownership structure plays a fundamental role in corporate debt maturity decisions and its
scope can hardly be separated from agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested
that, when firms face higher agency costs, ownership structure can be used to mitigate
them. This route implicitly impinges on corporate debt maturity. Along this line, Leland
(1998) and Lasfer (1999) pointed out that firms reduce debt maturity when they face
greater conflicts of interest between the administrator and the owner. Other investigations
have corroborated this hypothesis and have argued that this control policy helps mitigate
underinvestment or overinvestment practices developed by managers (Myers, 1977; Barnea
et al., 1980; Harris and Raviv, 1991; De Angelo et al., 2002; Guney and Ozkan, 2005).
During the last few decades, the empirical literature has studied the relationship bet-
ween ownership structure and corporate debt maturity in greater detail. Ozkan (2000),
Guney and Ozkan (2005) and Jiraporn and Tong (2008) pointed out that the ownership
concentration and debt maturity reduction would be a substitute means to control agency
costs associated with managerial discretion. Datta et al. (2005) corroborated this view,
arguing that firms shorten debt maturity when administrators have high participation in
the firm ownership. In their opinion, this is because manager interests are aligned with
those of other owners and the benefit of expropriating wealth is reduced. García and
Martínez (2010), in a study of 67 Spanish firms, between 1995 and 2001, also argued that
the negative relationship described was observed only when the company managers had
a high level of participation in corporate ownership. This fact reflects the low incentives
to underinvest or overinvest. In any case, Alcock et al. (2011) delved into this line and
explain that as manager interests are more aligned with those of the owners, the negative
relationship between the ownership concentration and debt maturity is reduced.
A preference for lengthening debt maturity is observed when managerial ownership is
low. Arslan and Karan (2006), in a study conducted on 134 Turkish firms, between 1997
and 2003, showed that an increase in managerial ownership, or the presence of a con-
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trolling shareholder, significantly increased debt maturity. Marchica (2008) corroborated
this finding and argued that, when managerial ownership is low, managers prefer long-
term debt as a way to mitigate bankruptcy risks and reduce the likelihood of losing their
corporate position. Along this line, Datta et al. (2005), Benmelech (2006), Harford et al.
(2008) and Tanaka (2015) found a similar relationship, although they warned that this
was due to the fact that managers with low ownership prefer to increase debt maturity as
a way of isolating themselves from the supervision of external financiers and entrench cor-
porate management rather than mitigate bankruptcy risks. Other investigations concur
with this last viewpoint known as managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986;
Berger et al., 1997; Gompers et al., 2003).
Few studies exist in Chile related to debt maturity. Azofra et al. (2004) and Saona and
Vallelado (2005) pointed out that ownership concentration generates a reduction in debt
terms as a way to impose better supervision on company administration. However, the
authors clarified that their results varied according to how debt maturity was measured.
Saona and Vallelado (2014) compared Chilean and Spanish companies and found that
when the corporate ownership of banks increases, managers shorten debt maturity as a
means of corporate governance and monitoring. More recently, Castañeda and Contreras
(2017) carried out a study for companies listed on the stock exchange, although they did
not incorporate the effects of ownership structure into their study. In any case, returning
to the findings described by empirical evidence, the fact that debt maturity is reduced
when corporate managerial ownership is high and increases when it is low could be due to a
non-linear effect exerted by managerial ownership on debt maturity (García and Martínez,
2010). This fact has not yet been investigated in Chile and, therefore, we formulated the
following hypothesis:
H1: Managerial ownership has a non-linear effect on debt maturity
Regarding the role of ownership structure, one issue that has attracted recent interest is
the effect of State ownership. In fact, State ownership in companies increased significantly
as a result of the subprime crisis (Borisova et al., 2015, Megginson, 2017). Megginson
(2010) pointed out that many countries have started a privatization process to reverse
this trend and to reduce the role of the state in companies. However, its effects have rarely
been investigated, especially those related to corporate decision making.
Several studies have shown that short-term debt increases supervision by external
financiers (Rajan andWinton, 1995; Park, 2000; Datta et al., 2005). However, in firms with
State ownership, the State could acts as a guarantor against possible financial breaches. In
this context, the State ownership could alter debt costs and reduces corporate governance
quality for companies, mainly in countries governed by civil law (Borisova and Megginson,
2011; Borisova et al., 2012; Borisova et al., 2015). Even so, firms with State ownership
could access long-term debt with lower collateral requirements. International evidence
along these lines is scarce. Choi (2015) showed that State ownership has a positive and
significant effect on corporate debt maturity in an empirical analysis of Chinese firms.
Boubakri and Saffar (2017) corroborated these results in a study applied to firms from
62 countries, between 2001 and 2014, arguing that State ownership in companies makes
requirements for access to debt financing more flexible. In Chile, there are no studies that
analyze the effects of State ownership on debt maturity and therefore we established the
following hypothesis:
H2: State ownership has a positive effect on debt maturity
2.2. Effects of growth opportunities on debt maturity
Several international studies have analyzed the effects of growth opportunities on corpo-
rate debt maturity. However, there is still no general consensus on this relationship due
to the existence of a trade-off between underinvestment and bankruptcy costs.
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Some studies in the literature state that growth opportunities negatively affect debt
maturity. Under the underinvestment hypothesis formulated by Myers (1977), it was
shown that developmental practices of unprofitable projects carried out by the owner-
manager block increase as growth opportunities increase. This policy expropriates bond-
holder wealth, triggering the agency shareholder-bondholder problem. However, incentives
to underinvest can be mitigated if firms finance growth opportunities through short-term
debt. Several studies have corroborated the validity of this hypothesis. Titman (1992)
explained that companies with greater growth opportunities faced a higher risk of ban-
kruptcy. In this context, the validity of the underinvestment hypothesis lies in the fact
that companies benefit from short-term debt not only because it controls agency costs
but also because of a reduction in financing costs. Aivazian et al. (2005) also corroborated
these findings, arguing that the negative relationship between long-term debt and growth
opportunities is more pronounced when these cannot be anticipated in advance. The aut-
hors have noted that, in these cases, the information asymmetry content of long-term
debt increases the incentives to underinvest. Others research has supported these results
and has pointed out that the trade-off between underinvestment costs and liquidity risks
tends to favor the first (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Barclay and Smith, 1995, 1996; Stohs
and Mauer, 1996; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Macsimovic, 1999; Scherr
and Hulburt, 2001; Ozkan, 2000, 2002; Barclay et al., 2003; Johnson, 2003; Benmelech,
2006; Arslan and Karan, 2006; Billet et al., 2007; García and Martínez, 2010; Orman and
Köksal, 2017).
Another group of studies found in the literature describes a positive relationship bet-
ween debt maturity and growth opportunities. Diamond (1991) argued that when firms
have greater growth opportunities, the discretionary behavior of managers in relation to
these opportunities leads companies to issue long-term debt as a way to mitigate liquidity
and bankruptcy risk. Along this same line, Hart and More (1995) and Childs et al. (2005)
added that long-term debt can prevent managers from financing unprofitable projects
by limiting their future financing capacity. This policy also helps to mitigate the risk of
bankruptcy. Other studies have corroborated this view in several countries, such as the
United States (Datta et al., 2005; Alcock et al., 2011), the United Kingdom (Antoniou et
al., 2006; Dang, 2011) and Italy (Domenichelli, 2015). This view has also been corrobo-
rated in international comparisons among various countries (Fan et al., 2010; Chang et
al., 2011; Kirch and Soares, 2012; Turk, 2016; Boubakri and Saffar, 2017).
In Chile, there is little evidence in this area and the existing findings are partially
contradictory. On one hand, Azofra et al. (2004) indicated that firms with greater growth
opportunities financed their investment set with long-term debt, a fact that is consistent
with the bankruptcy risk mitigation hypothesis. However, when companies belonged to
corporate holdings, they developed an internal capital market that allowed them to fi-
nance their investments with short-term debt and with lower costs than those existing
in the market. On the other hand, Saona and Vallelado (2005) and Castañeda and Con-
treras (2017) showed that firms with greater growth opportunities shortened debt terms,
endorsing the underinvestment hypothesis.
In any case, international evidence clearly points out that the effects of growth op-
portunities on debt maturity depend on trade-offs between underinvestment costs and
bankruptcy risks. Myers and Majluf (1984) pointed out that, when growth opportunities
are low, firms will prefer to finance their investments with short-term debt. If these op-
tions are high enough to compensate for information asymmetry costs, firms could issue
long-term debt and even equity. This suggests that growth opportunities have a non-linear
effect on corporate debt maturity and, therefore, we formulated the following hypothesis:
H3: Growth opportunities have a non-linear effect on debt maturity
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2.3. Effects of capital structure on debt maturity
Debt level can also affect debt terms. Although empirical evidence has shown a lack
of consensus regarding this relationship, recent research has revealed that debt levels
are relevant when quantifying their impact on debt maturity. Regarding this lack of
consensus, Johnson (2003) pointed out that the relationship between firms debt levels
and debt maturity depends on the trade-off between the risk of non-optimal investment
policies and bankruptcy. Alcock et al. (2011) pointed out that said trade-off may change
if firms incorporate their need to reduce financing costs in the debt maturity decision.
This fact modifies the ways firms react to bankruptcy risks. These arguments corroborate
the fact that debt levels can have positive or negative effects on debt maturity.
Some studies have argued that debt level has a negative effect on debt maturity. Jensen
(1986) asserted that agency costs derived from overinvestment practices lead companies
to issue debt as a way to mitigate these costs and align manager interests to those of
the owners. In this context, debt issued expose administrators to external supervision,
inhibiting their discretionary behavior. This debt control effect could be replaced by lower
debt maturity (Billet et al., 2007). Barclay et al. (2003), in a study of 5765 companies
in the United States, found evidence of a negative and significant relationship between
debt level and debt maturity. Their findings showed that firms issue shorter-term debt to
control overinvestment or underinvestment problems (Alcock et al., 2012). Jensen (1986)
added that problems of non-optimal investments are observed in firms with low debt levels.
However, Alcock et al. (2011) warned that a negative relationship between leverage and
debt maturity is also observed when debt levels are high. In the opinion of these authors,
this context causes a greater probability of default that leads companies to issue short-
term debt to offset this risk. Debts issued contain covenants that significantly reduce
additional debt costs, guaranteeing a company’s ability to pay.
Other investigations have contradicted this view, endorsing a positive relationship
between debt levels and debt maturity. Leland and Toft (1996) pointed out that this
relationship is explained by a greater preference of firms to mitigate bankruptcy risk.
Morris (1992) added that firms opt for such a policy when their debt levels are high, thus
increasing the probability of paying their creditors. Several international studies support
this view (Diamond, 1991; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Antoniou et al.,
2006; Benmelech, 2006; Hackethal and Jansen, 2006; Körner, 2007; Soares, 2009; García
and Martínez, 2010; Dang, 2011; Alcock et al., 2011, 2012). In Chile, Muñoz and Sepúlveda
(2016) showed that a positive relationship exists between debt level and debt maturity,
a fact that reflects the preference to mitigate bankruptcy risk. However, Alcock et al.
(2011) pointed out that this type of relationship can only be observed if the debt lacks a
covenant. The authors added that, in this case, companies accept mitigating bankruptcy
risks by accepting higher debt costs.
The trade-off between non-optimal investment and bankruptcy costs suggests that the
relationship between debt levels and debt maturity is non-linear. However, the form of
non-linearity depends on whether firms face the risk of bankruptcy issuing debt with or
without covenants (Alcock et al., 2011). When firms issue debt without covenants, the
costs of non-optimal investment policies force companies to reduce debt maturity when
their level of debt is low, while the risk of bankruptcy leads them to increase the debt
term when debt level is high. In this case, the relationship between leverage and debt
maturity would be U-shaped (Hackethal and Jansen, 2006). When firms issue debt with
covenants, this relationship would be in the form of an inverted U. Thus, firms mitigate
bankruptcy risks by issuing long-term debt when their debt level is low and benefit from
lower costs of short-term debt when their debt level is high. In Chile, this relationship has
not been investigated despite the restrictive characteristics of financial regulations that
govern the bank and corporate debt issuances. This leads us to formulate the following
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hypothesis:
H4: Debt level has a non-linear effect on debt maturity
The relationship between debt level and maturity could be affected by firm size. Joeveer
(2013) pointed out that the way in which financing policy is defined differs between small
and large firms. Small firms financing policy tend to respond more to specific factors of
countries, such as economic growth cycle, rather than to their own factors. This finan-
cing is mainly short-term debt and banking debt (Mokhova and Zinecker, 2014). Large
company debt depends more on specific firm characteristics that allow them to access
long-term financing sources. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) pointed out that
large companies access long-term financing through participation in capital markets. The
authors added that capital market development does not affect small company financing.
In Chile, the financial system is significantly oriented towards banking and faces sig-
nificant levels of information asymmetry regarding companies. According to Saona et al.,
(2014), this context makes small businesses more dependent on bank financing. However,
the greater degree of information asymmetry associated with small companies raises finan-
cing costs, increasing their liquidity risk. Companies take out long-term loans to mitigate
this problem. On the contrary, for large companies, overinvestment problems and lower
growth prospects mean that debt and maturity constitute another way of mitigating this
problem. These differences led us to formulate the following hypothesis:
H5: Debt has a positive (negative) effect on debt maturity for small (large) firms.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Sample of data
The data used in this investigation were extracted from the Longitudinal Business Survey
(hereinafter LBS) prepared by the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism in
Chile. The data are based on four versions of this survey, which are denoted as LBS1,
LBS2, LBS3 and LBS4. These surveys represent business information for the years 2007,
2009, 2013 and 2015, respectively. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in this in-
vestigation. The information collected from the LBS is related to business, finance and
accounting. However, the LBS does not provide market information.
Samples were organized into a pooled data set composed of 20,586 firms. This sample
consisted of 6,647 firms drawn from LBS1, 3,882 from LBS2, 4,190 from LBS3 and 5,867
from LBS4. Companies with incomplete records or that belonged to the financial sector
were not considered in the sample.
Debt Maturity (DM) is the dependent variable, measured by long-term debt to to-
tal debt ratio. This measurement has been widely used in empirical studies to measure
corporate debt terms (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Antoniou et al., 2006;
Dang, 2011; Alcock et al., 2011).
Regarding ownership structure variables, we used three dummy variables which adop-
ted the 1 value depending on the manager role in a company’s ownership structure: ow-
ner/manager (OS1) if the manager owns 100% of the company, partner/manager (OS2)
if the manager is one of the owners of the company and outside/manager (OS3) if the
manager has no ownership in the firm. The effect of these variables is complemented by
the managerial ownership percentage (MO). These types of variables have been sugges-
ted by several international studies as a way of measuring the potential effects of aligned
interests between managers and owners or managerial entrenchment on debt maturity
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ozkan, 2000; Guney and Ozkan, 2005; Datta et al., 2005;
Benmelech, 2006; Harford et al., 2008). We also considered the role of State ownership
(SO) as a way of verifying whether the State’s participation in corporate ownership was
28
REMEF (The Mexican Journal of Economics and Finance)
Non-linear Effects of Ownership Structure, Growth Opportunities
and Leverage on Debt Maturity in Chilean Firms
synonymous with financial support, allowing companies to access long-term debt (Choi,
2015; Boubakri and Saffar, 2017).
Table 1. Variables
Variable Description
Dependent variable
DM Debt Maturity Long-term debt to total debt ratio
Ownership structure
OS1 Owner/manager Dummy 1 if the manager owns the company and 0 otherwise
OS2 Partner/manager Dummy 1 if the manager is a company partner and 0 otherwise
MO Managerial ownership Percentage of managerial ownership, where manager is a partner
OS3 Outside/manager Dummy 1 if the manager has not ownership in the firm and 0 otherwise
ST State Dummy 1 if the State has ownership in the company and 0 otherwise
SO State ownership State ownership percentage
Growth Opportunities
GO Growth in sales Annual percentage change in sales
Capital Structure
LEV Corporate debt Debt to equity ratio
Other control variables
AC Agency costs Operational expenses to sales ratio
FP Firm Profitability Return on assets ratio
EM External monitoring Commercial relationship with external financiers in years
FQ Firm quality Financial solvency measured by Z-Score
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets
HD Holding Dummy 1 if the firm belongs to a business holding and 0 otherwise
TANG Tangibility Long-term assets to total assets ratio
Source: Own elaboration.
The empirical literature has used company growth opportunities as a way to quantify
the effects of the trade-off between underinvestment and bankruptcy costs over corporate
debt maturity (Myers, 1977; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Arslan and Karan, 2006; García
and Martínez, 2010). Growth opportunities are commonly measured through indicators
such as Tobin’s Q and price-earnings ratios per share, which quantify the impact of future
company growth. However, in our investigation, we measured these options through an-
nual sales growth (GO). Danbolt et al. (2011) argued that current growth measurements,
based on accounting information, are positively and significantly correlated with future
firm growth. This, in addition to the fact that LBS does not provide market information
such as with the Tobin’s Q, justifies the use of this proxy.
Capital structure (LEV), measured by the debt to equity ratio, is another factor used
to control debt maturity. This variable is used to quantify the impact of the trade-off
between the costs of overinvestment and liquidity risk (Diamond, 1991; Stohs and Mauer,
1996; Barclay et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Antoniou et al., 2006; Billet et al., 2007;
Alcock et al., 2012).
Other debt maturity control variables are also included which have been suggested by
various investigations. Agency Costs (AC) measures the effects of managerial discretion in
the principal-agent conflict (Leland, 1998; Lasfer, 1999). Per the recommendations of Ang
et al. (2000) and Fleming et al. (2005), we will measure agency costs using the operational
expenses to sales ratio.
Other control variables that have been suggested by empirical studies are firm credit
quality (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991; Dang, 2011), firm profitability (Barclay et al.,
2003), external monitoring (Ang et al., 2000), firm size (Benmelech, 2006; Alcock et al.,
2011), and asset tangibility (Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Scherr and Hurlburt, 2001).
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3.2. Econometric method
Diverse studies analyzed the debt maturity and used various econometric techniques for
modeling this variable. Studies based on panel data, formed by stock exchange listed firms
and those compare different markets, have mostly used GMM estimators for dynamic
models or fixed-effect models (Körner, 2007, Antoniou et al., 2006; and Soares, 2012;
Saona and Vallelado, 2005, 2014). The reason for using this type of model is not only
due to the type of data structure, but also because the stock exchange listed firms have a
debt maturity that will always be between 0 (only short-term debt) and 1 (only long-term
debt), but will not reach any of these limits.
Other studies use the Tobit model proposed by Tobin (1958). These studies have
used data that includes both large and small companies, and normally organized in cross
section data (Johnson, 1997, Muñoz and Sepúlveda, 2016). Following the suggestions of
Amemiya (1984, 1985), we used the Two-Limit Tobit Regression (TLTR) to estimate
the effects of ownership structure, growth opportunities and debt on the corporate debt
maturity of Chilean firms. This is due the firm characteristics, mainly SMEs, allow us to
visualize the total use of short or long-term debt. The general model is as follows:
y∗i = β
′xi + εi (1)
Where y∗i is the latent dependent variable measured by debt maturity (DMi). In
addition, β is a coefficients vector and xi is the exogenous variables matrix. If yi is the
debt maturity observable into the interval [0,1] we have:
yi =
 L1j = 0 if yi ≤ L1jy∗i if L1j < y∗i < L2j
L2j = 1 if y
∗
i ≤ L2j
(2)
Where L1i and L2i are the lower and upper limits, respectively. Now, the empirical
model that evaluates the effects of the ownership structure, growth opportunities and
leverage on debt maturity is:
β′xi = β0 + β1OSI + β2MOi + β3MO2i + β4SOi + β5SO
2
i + β6GOi + β7GO
2
i +
β8LEVi + β9LEV
2
i + β10FQi + β11FPi + β12ACi + β13EMi + β14SIZEi + β15HDi +
β16TANGi + β17DY ear + β18DSector (3)
DMi is the dependent variable and represents the debt maturity of company i. Debt
maturity is measured by the long-term debt to total debt ratio, which restricts this variable
to the [0,1] interval.OSi is ownership structure, defined by the three dichotomous variables
described in table 1. Managerial ownership is included (MOi) and its square too (MO2i ).
The latter is used to incorporate the non-monotonicity of the managerial ownership effect.
Similarly, we controlled the model through State ownership (SOi) and its square (SO2i ).
The GOi variable corresponds to growth opportunities, where GO2i is the square, LEVi is
the capital structure of the company and, accordingly, LEV 2i is the square of this variable.
The model indicated in (3) includes firm credit quality (FQi), firm profitability (FPi),
agency costs (ACi), external monitoring (EMi), firm size (SIZEi), the dummy variable
which measures firm that belongs to business conglomerate (HDi) and asset tangibility
(TANGi) as explanatory variables. Finally, εi is a random disturbance.
To estimate the effects of capital structure on debt maturity according to firm size
and its relation with high growth opportunities, we used a Two-Limit Tobit Regression
model (TLTR). The empirical model is the following:
β′xi = β0 +β1OSI +β2MOi+β3MO2i +β4SOi+β5SO
2
i +β6GOi+β7LEVi+β8(LEVi×
DSIZE) + β9(LEVi ×DHG) + β10(LEVi ×DHG×DSIZE) + β11FQi + β12FPi +
β13ACi + β14EMi + β15SIZEi + β16HDi + β17TANGi + β18DY ear+ β19DSector (4)
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DMi is the dependent variable representing the debt maturity of companies i. The
control variables in (4) have the same definition as those used in model (3). Note that we
have included several iterative controls in (4). The iterative variable (LEVi × DSIZE)
shows the effect of debt level on debt maturity according to firm size, where DSIZE is
a dummy variable that adopts a value of 1 when the company is small (also defined in
parallel for large firms) and 0 otherwise. According to Dang (2011), the iterative variable
(LEVi ×DHG) shows the effect of debt level on debt maturity when the firm has a high
level of growth opportunities. DHG is a dummy variable that adopts a value of 1 when
the firm has high growth opportunities. The definition of this variable considers firms
whose sales grow above the average of their sector as high growth companies. Finally
(LEVi×DHG×DSIZE) shows the effect of capital structure on firms with high growth
opportunities according to size.
Both models (3) and (4) are controlled through dummy variables which measure dif-
ferences between productive sectors (DSectori) as well as survey year (DYear). We used
robust variances to control heteroscedasticity patterns. The models (3) and (4) are esti-
mated by Maximum Likelihood (ML), being the likelihood function:
L (β, σ|yi, xi, L1i, L2i) =∏
yi=L1i
Φ
(
L1i−β′xi
σ
)∏
yi=y∗i
{
1
σφ
(
yi−β′xi
σ
)}∏
yi=L2i
{
1− Φ
(
L2i−β′xi
σ
)}
(5)
Where Φ(ﬄ) denotes the cumulative probability function for standard normal distri-
bution, φ(ﬄ) denotes the probability density function for standard normal distribution
and σ is the standard deviation of εi term. In this way, the expected value for debt
maturity will be given by:
E (yi|L1i < y∗i < L2i) = β′xi + E (εi|L1i − β′xi < εi < L2i − β′xi) = β′xi + σ
(
φ1i−φ2i
Φ1i−Φ2i
)
(6)
Where Φ1i and Φ2i represent the probability density functions evaluated in the lower
and upper limits. Analogously, Φ1i and Φ2i represent the accumulated probability fun-
ctions.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 2 shows the sample descriptive analysis. It is observed that the debt maturity osci-
llates between 0 and 1, that is, between 0% and 100% long-term debt to total debt, with
an average of 0.1902. This result indicates that 19.02% of corporate debt is long-term. In
addition, this characteristic of the debt maturity variable allows use Tobit model.
It should be noted that the variables defined through dummies adopt the value 1
when they have a specific quality and 0 otherwise. For this reason, their averages indicate
the proportion or percentage of companies that have the specific characteristic. Such
are the cases of the Owner/manager (OS1), Partner/manager (OS2), Outside/manager
(OS3) and State (ST) variables. Our results indicate that 21.52% of the companies are
managed by a manager who is also the total owner of the company (OS1), 36.35% of the
companies are managed by a manager who is a partial owner of the company (OS2) and
whose average ownership is 41.32% (MO), 42.13% of the companies are managed by an
external manager who does not have ownership in the company (OS3). Finally, we note
that 1.61% of companies have a State (ST) presence in their ownership structure, with
an average state ownership (SO) of 1.43%.
Other firm qualities show that the growth opportunities (GO) are equivalent to an
annual sales growth of 16.39%, while the average debt-to-equity ratio (LEV) is 2.23,
which marks the primary use of debt as funding source. The operational expense to sales
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ratio that quantifies the agency costs (AC) is on average 18.45%, while the average firms
profitability (FP) is 11.80%. It should be noted that 24.04% of the companies belong to
business holdings (HD).
Table 2. Statistical summary.
Full sampleVariable Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Debt maturity (%) 19.02 29.05 0 1
Ownership structure
Owner/manager (%) 21.52 40.61 0 1
Partner/manager (%) 36.35 47.95 0 1
Managerial ownership (%) 41.32 34.03 0.02 0.95
Outside/manager (%) 42.13 48.12 0 1
State (%) 1.61 7.65 0 1
State ownership (%) 1.43 6.07 0 1
Growth opportunities
Growth in sales (%) 16.39 32.13 -4.32 28.45
Capital structure
Corporate debt 2.23 2.72 0 13.73
Other control variables
Agency costs (%) 18.45 18.99 0 36.94
Firm profitability (%) 11.8 11.6 -18.46 37.32
External monitoring (years) 15 12.06 0 76
Firm quality (level) 4.99 4.16 -4.95 19.75
Firm size (Bill. $) 129.21 621 0.001 783.96
Holding (%) 24.04 41.86 0 1
Tangibility (%) 28.92 30.07 5.49 97.47
Source: Own elaboration
Table 3 indicates the statistical summary of the company sample by survey. It is
important to mention that the LBS sample design shows the growing participation of
large companies from the first to the fourth version of the survey. This fact explains some
statistical results, mainly for ownership structure, financing and firm size.
The statistical results for ownership structure indicate that managerial participation
in ownership structure goes from 52.58% in LBS1 to 26.47% in LBS4. This fact shows
that ownership structures are more diluted towards LBS4, which is related to a greater
presence of large companies. In line with the above, the firms managed by an external
manager increased from 27.23% in LBS1 to 57.80% in LBS4, while firms managed by
their owner declined from 35.71% to 12.51% for the same surveys. Firms managed by a
partner/manager had showed more stable behavior in relation to other managerial roles.
State ownership in companies was comparatively small. Firms with State presence in their
ownership structure fluctuated between 1.28% and 1.85%, with an average participation
no greater than 1.55%. Although State presence in Chilean firms is small, its corporate
and institutional effects are empirically relevant. More diluted ownership structures are
consistent with the higher agency costs described in the sample.
Firm capital structure shows the significant presence of debt in corporate financing.
The debt-to-equity ratio went from 1.45 in the LBS1 to 3.88 in the LBS4, an increase from
59.18% to 74.22% if debt is measured in relation to total assets. This was accompanied by
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a greater use of long-term debt, which increased by 6.09% in the LBS4 with respect to the
LBS1 and an increasingly extensive relationship with external financiers. The proportion
of long-term assets increased by approximately 6.59% in the same period, which supports
the finding that companies match the maturity of their liabilities with that of their assets.
Despite the growing use of long-term debt shown in LBS4, short-term debt had a greater
presence in corporate debt composition.
Table 3. Statistical summary by survey/year.
2007 2009 2013 2015Variable Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Dependent variable
Debt maturity (%) 16.63 28.81 17.01 28.16 19.72 28.96 22.72 30.25
Ownership structure
Owner/manager (%) 35.71 49.6 21.64 41.21 18.15 38.54 12.51 33.09
Partner/manager (%) 38.04 48.66 41.05 49.29 36.63 48.18 29.67 45.68
Managerial ownership (%) 52.58 28.29 50.8 27.94 35.45 41.43 26.47 38.46
Outside/manager (%) 27.23 45.85 38.29 47.47 45.19 49.77 57.8 49.39
State (%) 1.7 8.37 1.59 7.69 1.85 9.2 1.28 5.32
State ownership (%) 1.49 6.35 1.43 6.15 1.55 7.01 1.23 4.78
Growth opportunities
Growth in sales (%) 22.83 30.68 14.9 33.86 16.78 31.49 11.06 32.47
Capital structure
Corporate debt 1.45 2.14 1.52 2.13 2.09 2.56 3.88 4.06
Other control variables
Agency costs (%) 11.38 15.74 24.5 21.12 17.75 18.3 20.15 20.81
Firm profitability (%) 13.15 21.11 11.91 8.18 9.29 10.4 12.86 6.71
External monitoring (years) 12.82 12.54 12.65 10.16 16.34 11.56 18.17 13.98
Firm quality (level) 5.74 5.21 3.59 3.25 3.74 4.19 6.9 3.97
Firm size (Bill. $) 20.44 338.4 150.15 816.12 168.4 683.46 177.83 646.02
Holding (%) 13.57 34.25 21.52 41.1 29.37 45.55 31.69 46.53
Tangibility (%) 28.56 27.62 29.31 26.67 22.65 26.05 35.15 39.94
Source: Own elaboration.
Firm growth opportunities declined through the surveys. The annual growth of sales
fell from 22.83% in the LBS1 to 11.06% in the LBS4. Along the same line, firm profita-
bility also fell, although to a lesser extent. In spite of the above, firms credit quality in
the sample showed a low probability of bankruptcy.
Finally, we highlighted that the proportion of companies belonging to corporate hol-
dings increased from 13.57% in the LBS1 to 31.69% in the LBS4. This fact is in line with
the greater presence of large companies in the sample.
4.2. Non-linear effects of ownership structure, growth opportuni-
ties and leverage
Model (3) results are presented in Table 4 (marginal effects). The Tobit model includes
dummy variables in order to capture systematic differences according to different econo-
mic sectors and years. Wald is a chi-square test that under the null hypothesis supports
the non-statistical relevance of all model parameters. In all cases, this test is rejected, a
result that supports the global significance of all estimated models.
Control variables such as firm credit quality (FQ), firm profitability (FP), external
monitoring (EM) and belonging to a business holding (HD) have a negative and signi-
ficant effect on debt maturity. Thus, profitable firms with higher credit quality, with a
more extensive relationship with their financiers and that its part of business conglomera-
tes prefer short-term debt. Agency costs (AC) have a negative effect, but not significant.
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Control variables have the expected effects, as proposed by international studies (Flan-
nery, 1986; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Lasfer, 1999). On the other hand, firm size (SIZE)
and asset tangibility (TANG) have a positive and significant effect (Arslan and Karan,
2006; Benmelech, 2006; Alcock et al., 2012; Muñoz and Sepúlveda, 2016).
Ownership structure has significant effects on the debt maturity of Chilean compa-
nies. Debt maturity is significantly reduced when the firm is managed by owner/manager
(OS1) and increased if the company is managed by a partner/manager (OS2) or an outsi-
de manager (OS3). This result partially supports the idea that debt maturity reductions,
caused by ownership concentration, align managerial interests with that of firm owners.
The longer debt terms observed when the ownership is diluted is a reflection of the mana-
ger’s intention to avoid external supervision. Along the same line, managerial ownership
(MO) has a positive and non-linear effect on debt maturity. This result corroborates hy-
pothesis H1. Nonlinearity indicates that, when the managerial ownership is low, debt
maturity increases significantly. This result is consistent with the managerial entrench-
ment hypothesis (Berger et al., 1997; Gompers et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2005; Arslan
and Karan, 2006; Benmelech, 2006; Harford et al., 2008). However, when the managerial
ownership exceeds 58.74%, the effect is reversed, causing a reduction in debt terms, which
supports the debt control hypothesis (Ozkan, 2000; Guney and Ozkan, 2005; García and
Martínez, 2010). In addition, the positive effect of the MO variable is due to the fact that
managerial ownership, which on average is 41.32%, is below the inflection level.
State ownership (SO) also has a positive and significant effect on debt maturity, sup-
porting hypothesis H2. State ownership allows companies to access long-term debt, and
most likely with less collateral requirements. This result is consistent with the findings of
Choi (2015) and Boubakri and Saffar (2017). However, the non-monotonicity of the SO
variable suggests that the positive impact only exists when state ownership levels are less
than 47%.
Growth opportunities (GO), measured through the annual sales growth, points to a
negative effect on debt maturity. This effect is significant at 1% and is in line with se-
veral international studies (Myers, 1977; Titman, 1992; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Ozkan,
2000; Johnson, 2003; Arslan and Karan, 2006; García and Martínez, 2010). Results show
that greater growth opportunities open spaces to allow the manager-shareholder block to
develop underinvestment practices, through which creditors are expropriated from wealth
them. To mitigate the cost of underinvestment, companies shorten debt maturity to im-
pose a more rigorous supervision on company management. In addition, growth opportu-
nities effect is non-linear, validating hypothesis H3. Non-linearity suggests that this effect
is not persistent. When annual sales growth exceeds 21.82%, growth opportunities positi-
vely affect debt maturity. This second effect reveals that long-term debt limits managerial
discretion in relation to investment policy and promotes the mitigation of liquidity risk.
Corporate debt level (LEV) has a positive and significant effect on debt maturity.
According to several empirical studies, this result reveals that Chilean firms prefer to
mitigate bankruptcy and liquidity risks when issuing debt (Diamond, 1991; Morris, 1992;
Leland and Toft, 1996; Datta et al., 2005; Dang, 2011). In addition, the effect of debt
on maturity is non-linear, a result which favors hypothesis H4. Non-linearity observed
for the effect of debt level on debt maturity has two implications. First, this non-linear
relationship has an inverted U-shape. Alcock et al. (2011) stated that the relationship
between leverage and maturity has this shape if the debt issued uses restrictive covenants
in contracts. This fact guides the trade-off between overinvestment risk and bankruptcy
risk towards minimization of debt costs, through more restrictive covenants. Second, given
the form of the non-linear relationship, when the debt to equity ratio is greater than
8.61, the effect of debt level on debt maturity becomes negative. In this way, when debt
level is high, reduction in debt maturity becomes a means of effectively controlling the
overinvestment problem (Barclay et al., 2003). On the contrary, the positive impact of
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leverage on debt terms is explained because the magnitude of debt of Chilean companies
averages 2.23, which is clearly lower than the critical level.
Table 4. Tobit regression for debt maturity in Chilean firms, marginal effects.
Dependent variable: Debt maturity measured
by long-term debt to total debt ratioExplanatory variables -1 -2 -3
A. Ownership structure
OS1 -0.0307**
(-2.25)
OS2 0.0273**
-2.08
MO 0.1135**
-2.39
MO squared -0.0966**
(-2.22)
MO inflexion point 58.74%
OS3 0.0275**
-2.51
SO 0.3462** 0.3936** 0.3812**
-2.19 -2.01 -1.97
SO squared -0.3677** -0.4057** -0.3976**
(-1.96) (-1.99) (-2.07)
SO inflexion point 47.07% 48.51% 47.93%
B. Growth opportunities and leverage
GO -0.0022*** -0.0029*** -0.0024***
(-3.30) (-3.25) (-3.28)
GO squared 0.0046** 0.0062** 0.0055**
-2.33 -2.36 -2.34
GO inflexion point 23.91% 23.38% 21.82%
LEV 0.0775*** 0.0776*** 0.0780***
-19.58 -19.6 -19.72
LEV squared -0.0045*** -0.0045*** -0.0045***
(-14.46) (-14.46) (-14.58)
LEV inflexion point 8.61 8.62 8.67
C. Other control variables
FQ -0.0043*** -0.0041*** -0.0039***
(-3.36) (-3.22) (-3.13)
FP -0.2033*** -0.2109*** -0.2153***
(-6.79) (-7.06) (-7.24)
AC -0.0126 -0.0085 -0.0089
(-0.49) (-0.33) (-0.35)
EM -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0005**
(-2.14) (-2.18) (-2.40)
SIZE 0.0660*** 0.0695*** 0.0703***
-26.49 -27.44 -29.25
HD -0.0485*** -0.0360*** -0.0411***
(-4.11) (-2.93) (-3.37)
TANG 0.5370*** 0.5341*** 0.5331***
-31.16 -31 -31.02
Observations 20586 20586 20586
Pseudo-R2 0.17 0.18 0.17
Wald (934.15)*** (945.37)*** (935.37)***
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes
Marginal effects. Z-statistics in bracket. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5,
and 10 percent, respectively. Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 5 shows model (4) results. Variables such as firm credit quality (FQ), firm
profitability (FP), external monitoring (EM) and belonging to a business holding (HD)
have a negative effect, similar to that observed in Table 4. Firm size (SIZE) and asset
tangibility (TANG) have a positive effect. Agency costs (AC) have no effect on debt
maturity. Ownership structure (OS), managerial ownership (MO), State ownership (SO)
and growth opportunities (GO) also presented similar results to those described in Table
4.
Table 5. Tobit regression for debt maturity in Chilean firms, marginal effects.
Dependent variable: Debt maturity measured
by the long-term debt to total debt ratioExplanatory variables -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
A. Ownership structure
OS1 -0.0351** -0.0351**
(-2.55) (-2.55)
OS2 0.0245** 0.0245**
-1.99 -1.99
MO 0.1437*** 0.1437***
-2.75 -2.75
MO squared -0.1090*** -0.1090***
(-2.63) (-2.63)
OS3 0.0276** 0.0276**
-2.5 -2.5
SO 0.3439* 0.3936** 0.3808** 0.3439* 0.3936** 0.3808**
-1.87 -2 -1.97 -1.87 -2 -1.97
SO squared -0.3635* -0.4035* -0.3953** -0.3635* -0.4035* -0.3953**
(-1.78) (-1.91) (-2.46) (-1.78) (-1.91) (-2.46)
B. Growth opportunities and leverage
GO -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0034*** -0.0031*** -0.0029*** -0.0034***
(-2.97) (-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.97) (-2.94) (-2.97)
LEV 0.0136*** 0.0135*** 0.0131*** 0.0277*** 0.0279*** 0.0280***
-4.67 -4.64 -4.51 -14.73 -14.83 -14.92
LEV DSmall 0.0141*** 0.0144*** 0.0149***
-4.33 -4.41 -4.6
LEV DLarge -0.0141*** -0.0144*** -0.0149***
(-4.33) (-4.41) (-4.60)
LEVDHG -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0274*** -0.0275*** -0.0277***
(-0.98) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-13.63) (-13.72) (-13.80)
LEV DHG DSmall -0.0191** -0.0193** -0.0195**
(-2.21) (-2.22) (-2.24)
LEV DHG DLarge 0.0191** 0.0193** 0.0195***
-2.21 -2.22 -2.24
C. Other control variables
FQ -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0036*** -0.0039*** -0.0038*** -0.0036***
(-3.11) (-2.96) (-2.86) (-3.11) (-2.96) (-2.86)
FP -0.2165*** -0.2246*** -0.2297*** -0.2165*** -0.2246*** -0.2297***
(-7.20) (-7.48) (-7.69) (-7.20) (-7.48) (-7.69)
AC -0.0168 -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0168 -0.0123 -0.0126
(-0.65) (-0.47) (-0.49) (-0.65) (-0.47) (-0.49)
EM -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0011*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0011***
(-2.64) (-2.69) (-2.96) (-2.64) (-2.69) (-2.96)
SIZE 0.0716*** 0.0754*** 0.0764*** 0.0716*** 0.0754*** 0.0764***
-27.37 -28.42 -30.53 -27.37 -28.42 -30.53
HD -0.0430*** -0.0301** -0.0355*** -0.0430*** -0.0301** -0.0355***
(-3.62) (-2.43) (-2.89) (-3.62) (-2.43) (-2.89)
TANG 0.5365*** 0.5334*** 0.5321*** 0.5365*** 0.5334*** 0.5321***
-30.93 -30.76 -30.77 -30.93 -30.76 -30.77
Observations 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586 20586
Pseudo-R2 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
Wald (698.07)*** (710.18)*** (697.80)*** (698.07)*** (710.18)*** (697.80)***
Dummy sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marginal effects. Z-statistics are in brackets. Superscripts ***, ** and * indicate a statistical
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Source: Own elaboration.
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Corporate debt (LEV) has a positive impact on debt maturity, according to mitigating
bankruptcy risk. However, the effect of debt level on debt maturity varies according to firm
size. The dummy variable DSIZE, indicated in section 3.2, was defined simultaneously for
both small (DSmall) and large (DLarge) firms. The iterative variable LEVDSmall has a
positive and significant effect on debt maturity, while LEVDLarge has a negative impact,
which supports hypothesis H5. Thus, when small firms take out loans, they prefer to do
so in the long term, as to mitigate bankruptcy and liquidity risks, while large firms prefer
short-term debt as a way of controlling overinvestment. This difference is explained by
the differences in debt levels of these types of firms. According to sample data, small firms
have an average debt to equity ratio of 1.04, while large firms have a debt to equity ratio of
9.73. If we consider the concavity of the relationship between leverage and debt maturity
and that the critical inflection value is equivalent to a debt to equity ratio of 8.61, small
firms are located below this value and large firms above it. In line with Dang (2011),
we formulated the iterative variables LEVDHGDSmall and LEVDHGDlarge in order
to examine the relationship between leverage and debt maturity when small and large
companies face high growth opportunities. Results show that high growth opportunities
reverse the previous results. Thus, for small firms, their preference to mitigate bankruptcy
and liquidity risks is diluted and inclined to controlling underinvestment risks when they
have high growth opportunities. In large firms, the change is in favor of controlling the
long-term discretion of the administration.
5. Conclusions and discussion
Debt maturity is a subject that has been investigated extensively during the last few
decades. Different fields of analysis have placed it as a means of controlling various types
of costs within companies, affecting their market value.
Our investigation resulted in findings that agree with those of previous studies. On one
hand, variables such as firm credit quality, profitability, external monitoring and belonging
to business holding has a negative impact on debt maturity. On the other hand, firm size
and asset tangibility has the expected positive effect. Our results show that Chilean
companies that expand into long-term assets match the maturity of their investments
with that of their debts, although short-term debt replaces external monitoring, which is
associated with larger, more profitable companies and with higher credit quality.
According to the objectives of our research, we can summarize the implications of the
results in three points. First, ownership structure has significant effects on debt maturity.
Managerial ownership has a positive effect on debt maturity, which is consistent with the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis. This effect is observed for low levels of managerial
ownership and that does not exceed 58.74%. On average, managers own 41.32% of the
ownership of the Chilean companies included in the sample, a magnitude lower than the
level described. This result is relevant for the Chilean market and mainly for bondholders
and banks, who exercise external control role over these companies. Such control becomes
less rigorous when managers issue long-term debt to isolate themselves from supervision.
This entrenchment may be conducive to discretionary decisions taken by managers to
expropriate wealth from the owners. However, non-linearity suggests that, in companies
where managerial ownership exceeds 58.74%, debt maturity is reduced. This effect repla-
ces the corporate control role associated with the ownership concentration and mitigates
agency costs associated with managerial discretion and entrenchment. The form of non-
linearity indicates that Chilean companies consider minimizing the cost of debt in their
financing policy.
State ownership has a positive effect on debt maturity. Scarce international eviden-
ce in this matter attributes this result to the fact that the State represents a means of
financial support against a possible breach of the debt contract. This role of the State
makes creditor demands more flexible in terms of debt costs and guarantee requirements.
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However, in Chile, State participation in firm ownership is low in relation to other coun-
tries with similar structural characteristics. This context makes the role of the State as
guarantor very broad for Chilean companies. In fact, the positive relationship between
State ownership and debt maturity was observed in companies where State presence did
not exceed 47.07% ownership. If we consider that 1.61% of the companies in the sample
had a State presence in their ownership structure and that the average State participation
in these companies was 1.43%, we concluded that the positive effect of State ownership
on the debt maturity is relevant.
Second, growth opportunities have a negative and non-linear impact on debt maturity,
supporting the existence of a trade-off between underinvestment costs and bankruptcy
risk. When the annual growth of sales is less than 21.82%, the relationship between growth
opportunities and debt maturity is negative. This result suggests that for those levels of
sales growth, firms use short-term debt to mitigate underinvestment costs and to discipline
managers. For annual sales growth above that level, the preference for mitigating liquidity
and bankruptcy risk lead firms to issue long-term debt. This finding is of empirical and
practical relevance for creditors in Chile. The possibility of identifying firms according to
their growth opportunities allows investors to make an adequate debt term decision in
order to manage the expropriation of risks inherent to firms that underinvest.
Third, leverage is also relevant to the debt maturity decision. Our results indicate
that the debt level of Chilean companies has, on average, a positive effect on debt term
decisions, therefore helping to mitigate the bankruptcy risk. In addition, this relationship
is found to be non-linear and has an inverted U-shape, thus showing that Chilean firms
issue debt based on costly contracting which reduces the risk of creditors. As a result,
the control of liquidity and bankruptcy risks are observable until a debt to equity ratio
of 8.61. The negative relationship between leverage and debt maturity is consistent with
the overinvestment cost hypothesis. In any case, this trade-off differs according to firm
size. In small firms, this trade-off favors long-term debt, while in large firms it encourages
a reduction in debt maturity.
Our results contribute to the empirical evidence in the aspects described. However,
the impossibility of identifying firms through different surveys prevents the structuring of
the data as a panel and estimating the possible and unobservable firm qualities that could
affect debt maturity. Finally, we considered that debt maturity in Chilean companies is
a topic that has yet to be fully explored. Future studies should delve into the effect of
corporate governance practices on debt term length. This topic is of interest given Chile’s
entry into the OECD and the recommendations that this body has imposed on business
management practices and other matters in Chile.
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